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LAW REVIEW SUMMARIES
This section summarizes recent law review articles on a topic
chosen for its significance to contemporary controversial issues.
Due to recent advances in the electronic media on lifestylesparticularly in this, an election year-this issue will devote itself
to a review of recently published law review articles dealing
with the broadcasting industry. The opinions expressed in the
following summaries are those of the authors of the articles
reviewed.
Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on
Fairnessand Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768 (1972).
This article proposes that television's influence, especially its political
influence, on its viewers is greatly overestimated; consequently, recent
Federal decisions imposing harsh guidelines on the broadcasting
industry concerning the application of the fairness and access doctrines
should be carefully limited to prevent discriminatory abuse and
economic disaster. While accepting as correct that 95% of all homes in
the United States are equipped with televisions, and further, that the
average male viewer will spend over 3,000 entire days in his lifetime
watching television, the author suggests that television's influence on
any particular viewer varies inversely with that viewer's latent and
expressed resistance (and other personal attributes), and that viewer
resistance to political influence is high.
Concerning the application of the fairness doctrine, -the Federal
Communications Commission in 1967 enacted a regulation which
provided that a licensee must provide free rebuttal time to the
opponent of a party which has purchased time to present views on a
controversial issue of public importance. These regulations were upheld
by the Supreme Court in Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. F.C.C.'
While the altruistic motives of those concerned in producing these
regulations are not in question, the administrative nightmare which
would accompany strict implementation is completely unnecessary
inasmuch as television does not have the persuasive impact these
individuals have credited it with. To maintain that all or most viewers
will be glued to their chairs anxiously awaiting the rebuttal is absurd.
But even the administrative horrors take a back seat when faced with
the specter of the possibility of economic disaster. In 1968 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the application of the
fairness doctrine to advertisements. Because all advertising places its
product in its most favorable light without enumerating its possible
deficiencies, the logic of this decision, if strictly applied, could be
expanded to justify so many demands for free time as to threaten
broadcasting's advertising base, thus signaling economic doom.
1. 345 U.S. 367 (1969).

Law Review Summaries
The applicability of the fairness doctrine to advertising should be
retained, but in a way that will not jeopardize the very existence of the
broadcasting industry. This could be done by formulating clear but
flexible guidelines which could be administered by the broadcaster
himself, thus putting to rest the present uncertainty in the industry and
thereby avoiding unnecessary administrative expense.
The controversy involving the access doctrine is best exemplified by
the Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace2 decision where the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia reversed the decision of
the FCC. In that case, the broadcaster had refused to accept paid
"advertorials" which carried an anti-Vietnam war message to the
public. The Court of Appeals held that not only did broadcasting
constitute state action, but that a flat ban on all editorial advertising
was invalid. The case was remanded with instructions to the FCC to
formulate reasonable regulations that would prevent the domination of
the airwaves by a few groups or a few viewpoints.
The author feels that the Court has set a dangerous precedent by
basing its decision on constitutional rather than statutory (FCC)
grounds, thereby severely limiting the flexibility needed in the
regulatory scheme which it called for. Also, he has raised the collateral
question of whether printed publications involve state action. Further,
as in the fairness doctrine, the implementation of this access doctrine
soon-to-be-formulated raises the probability of another administrative
quagmire; the path therefrom being made treacherous by such
formidable problems as percentage of prime time for "advertorials",
special rates (or even no rates) for indigents, percentage of time for
substantial length programming, and percentage of total access time for
various minorities.

Johnson and Westen, A Twentieth-Century Soapbox: The Right to
PurchaseRadio and Television Time, 57 VA. L. REV. 574 (1971).
Federal Communications Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, sensitive
to the coercive censorship emanating from private corporations that
govern the media, expands his dissenting opinions in two recent Federal
that significantly affect
Communications Commission decisions'
applicability of first amendment speech freedoms in the broadcasting
sector. In each case the Commission denied the request of a national
political organization to purchase radio and television airtime at
existing commercial rates for the communication of timely political
2. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970), rev'd, 450 F.2d
642 (D.D.C. 1971).
1. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970), rev'd, 450 F.2d 642 (D.D.C. 1971);
Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970), rev'd, 450 F.2d
642 (D.D.C. 1971).
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speeches. Commissioner Johnson, in essence, argues that broadcast
licensees are in fact compelled by the first amendment and by statute
to honor the right of access-for-purchase to communicate protected
political ideas, and are precluded from regulating the form or substance
of such free expression. The Commissioner's analysis is predicated upon
the resolution of three issues: First, are first amendment principles
applicable to the broadcast media? Second, is the media an
"appropriate forum" to guarantee the public the "right of access"?
Third, does the 1934 Communications Act 2 impose such a requirement, if indeed the first amendment does not?
The author sustains his affirmative conclusion to the initial issue by
reference to the State Action, Self Enforcement, and Public Interest
Theories. The first advocates, that where governmental regulation
facilitates private activity in such a manner that private conduct
becomes action by the state in a constitutional context, then the
private sector is constrained by the first amendment. Johnson reasons
that the broadcast industry's functions are so integrated with state
action that it places its licensees within the ambit of the first
amendment, in that the federal government, through the Federal
Communications Commission has delegated the state's power over
broadcast frequencies to a private user of such public property in the
form of a three year license.
Assuming that the "marketplace of ideas" is the mass media in our
contemporary society, the Commissioner concludes that under the Self
Enforcement Theory, the first amendment, standing alone, prohibits all
forms of both governmental and private censorship. He argues that the
amendment's underlying purpose is the creation of a "marketplace of
ideas" into which all thoughts and forms of expression can freely enter,
notwithstanding the nature of title of ownership in the particular
forum. Finally, the author contends that licensees are subject to first
amendment restraint by virtue of the Public Interest Standard. Since
they must conduct their activities in accordance with "public interest,
convenience, and necessity" 3 as mandated by the 1934 Communications Act, Congress could not have intended to exclude the prohibitions
of the first amendment from these standards.
Resolution of the second issue is contingent on whether the property
had traditionally been utilized as a forum for communication, and
whether the owner had "opened up" the property in such a way that
free access and expression were not inconsistent with the property's
normal use. The Commissioner maintains that the frequencies allocated
to radio and television licensees are appropriate forums in that the
expression of ideas, whether political, commercial or otherwise, appears
to be the broadcast industry's exclusive purpose; there is no doubt that
2. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970), formerly Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
3. Id. at § 303.
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the media has "opened up" its frequencies to the general public by
making commercial programming time readily accessible to any
interested purchasers. The author argues that broadcast licensees, as
trustees for the public, do not possess an absolute unrestricted right to
monopolize the frequencies, but have only authority to establish
"reasonable" restrictions to assure the right of access. Commissioner
Johnson examines state and federal court decisions that have resolved
controversies involving precisely the same issue at hand (i.e., similar
groups seeking to purchase advertising and programming time
otherwise available for commerical use) and concludes that precedents
have held conclusively that the owner of a facility open to the public
could not accept commercial business and at the same time reject all
political offers to purchase.
Finally, if there is no constitutional right to access, the alternative
consideration is whether Congress has created one. In deciding these
two controversial cases, the FCC has effectively ruled that no right of
access is granted by the Communications Act of 1934. In his dissent,
Johnson contends that the Commission contravened its binding
interpretation of the Act in United BroadcastingCompany (WHKC) 4 in
which the majority specifically stated that broadcast licensees are
bound to make sufficient time available on a nondiscriminating basis
for the discussion of problems of public concern without any form of
censorship. FCC decisions subsequent to United Broadcasting
Company are interpreted by the author as construing the substantive
provisions of the Act in a manner intended by Congress and consistent
with first amendment criteria.
In his conclusion, the author proposes his recommendations to
facilitate implementation of a "system" of access for purchase.
Although conceding some deficiencies, he maintains that his scheme
offers more promise for resolution of the inherent inequities in the
broadcast system than the present personal attack, equal time or
fairness doctrines, and he reiterates his note of alarm at the absolute
censorial power possessed by the broadcast industry in the absence of
such a system.
Houser, The Fairness Doctrine-An HistoricalPerspective, 47 NOTRE
DAME LAW, 550 (1972).
The Fairness Doctrine, which was eventually codified in 1949,
evolved from a provision of the Radio Act of 1927' which delineated
the standard to be utilized in the comparative evaluation of competing
broadcast aspirants. The passage of this Act was necessitated by the
4. 10 F.C.C. 515.(1945).
1. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 652 § 602(a), 44 Stat. 1162.
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enormous growth of the radio industry in the early 1920's coupled with
the impotency of existing legislation. Prior to this Act the industry was
regulated by the Secretary of Commerce under the authority granted
by the Radio Act of 19122 which, although granting him licensing
authority and other powers, failed to provide enough discretionary
power to meet the demands of this early expansionary period. The
1927 version of this Act set up a five member Commission to limit
strictly the number of new licenses granted and to ferret out the
unworthy among those already holding broadcast licenses by a
comparative analysis utilizing "public convenience, interest, or necessity" as a standard.
By 1940 the Commission, with the support of the courts, had
established as a general rule that licensees who used the airways to
promote the viewpoint of any individual or group without a balanced
presentation of ideas was not operating "in the public interest" and,
consequently, was subject to remedial action. These decisions, instead
of insuring the desired balanced presentation, produced a curious
result-the station eliminated all editorializing and discussion of
controversial topics thus bypassing the impending sanctions and
thoroughly frustrating the Commission in its objective.
To break this stalemate and to clarify its own position, the
Commission eventually codified and published what has come to be
known as the "Fairness Doctrine." The licensees, as public trustees, had
two obligations: (1) to provide adequate coverage of important public
issues of interest in the community, and (2) to present both sides of the
issues for the public's consideration and acceptance or rejection. The
Commission issued no explanatory or concrete guidelines; but, rather,
decided to implement the doctrine on a case by case method, which, as
could be expected, produced no small amount of confusion and
uncertainty in the broadcast industry.
In 1967 an important corollary to the Fairness Doctrine, known as
the "Personal Attack Rules" was promulgated by the Federal
Communications Commission. These rules provide that if the honesty,
integrity or character of an individual or group is attacked, that
individual or group must be: (1) notified of the broadcast; (2) sent a
script, and (3) offered a reasonable opportunity to respond. These rules
immediately produced a challenge by the broadcasters but were upheld
by the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S.
367 (1969),' which in addition, held that, if necessary, a licensee must
make time available to such persons at his own expense in order to
fulfill his fairness obligation.
The most current inquiries concerning the applicability of the Fairness
2. Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302.
3. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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Doctrine are in the areas of advertising and political presentations.
Again, the ad hoc approach of the Federal Communications Commission has not produced consistency.
The Commission held that cigarette advertisements raised a
"controversial issue," therefore necessitating a balanced presentation;
but then declared that this was a unique decision and refused to extend
the decision to cover other advertisements, which on first glance,
appear at least as controversial. The Commission's treatment of political
presentations and advertisements is even less illuminating. Faced with a
myriad of rather unique problems which, if left unsolved, could
produce voluminous litigation, the FCC again has refrained from
issuing concrete guidelines.
Understandably, the Fairness Doctrine is currently under review;
and, while not proposing the ultimate solution, this author is wholly in
favor of a major review of the current policy.

Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?
37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969).
Differing from the conventional pessimistic perspective of his
contemporary "access-oriented" colleagues, the author perceives encouraging signs that an expanded approach to the first amendment is
gaining legal momentum and spawning a judicial foundation for the
right of access to the mass media. Recent state and federal court
decisions have responded more sensitively to an awareness that the
"marketplace of ideas" concept of the first amendment cannot
effectively guarantee a forum for free expression of ideas in a society
which has concentrated control in a few hands through accelerated
technological development of the mass media. The existence of this
concentration of control compels the simultaneous exercise of an
affirmative obligation on the government and the private sector to
provide access for ideas in addition to protection of ideas.
This article initially analyzes the significance of two recent New
York federal court opinions in support of an affirmative conception of
the first amendment. Although both cases discussed resolution of
freedom of expression issues arising in New York City subway stations
and bus terminals, the court implied that such quasi-public facilities
represent a forum similar to that which the streets have traditionally
offered for communication of ideas. The author contends that the
important and novel impact of the courts' rationale is the judicial
recognition that a protesting group has a constitutionally cognizant
interest in selecting a forum because that is where the relevant audience
is found, not because the forum is the object of the protest. Additional
access oriented support appears to have emanated from the Supreme
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Court's rationale in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc.,' 391 U.S. 308 (1968), which sustained informational picketing in
a privately owned shopping center. The majority reasoned that the
shopping center is the community focal point in suburban America, so
that access to its parking lot may be the only indispensable quasi-public
facility to insure access to that community.
Concluding that the judiciary now appears on the threshold of
expanding the opportunities for access to a more diverse class of
forums, the article submits that the test for such access will evolve from
the traditional public-or-private determination of the facility to an
inquiry into the necessity of access to the forum for the communication at issue. In essence, wherever there are facilities through which
large numbers of people can be easily reached there arises a right of
access to those forums by groups interested in using them to express
political or social ideas. Facilities in the private sector, if dedicated to
the public use, would be subject to an identical affirmative obligation
to establish a reasonable scheme of access for free communication. The
author maintains that the judicial process must consider the printed
media along traditional guidelines established by other first amendment
problems such as obscenity and libel. The inherent danger of prejudice
emanating from government administrators or juries making value
judgments as to the substance and form of press access compels
resolution by the appellate justices of this country of complex
constitutional issues. In contrast, the broadcasting industry appears to
require less judicial supervision in view of present legislation. Some
affirmative obligations already exist in the statutory mandates of the
equal time rule and the fairness doctrine found in the Federal
Communications Act, but the author stresses the necessity for a more
comprehensive correlation by the FCC between the section 315
responsibilities and the emerging access-oriented approach to the first
amendment. Citing the language of section 315 (a) which defines the
premise of the fairness doctrine, that broadcast licensees are required ". . . to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable
opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
importance," 2 the article reasons that this statutory duty represents a
mandate to do more than merely provide an opportunity for response
once the licensee has decided to give time to a particular view holder.
The FCC has interpreted the language as merely giving statutory force
to the fairness doctrine, but a broader construction of the directive
would justify imposition of an affirmative duty of access for
controversial issues. Congress need not assume the task of promulgating
new legislation to enforce the public's right of access: the burden falls
on the FCC to recognize the contemporary relationship of section 315

1. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970).
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responsibilities to basic first amendment objectives, and to utilize the
existing structure of broadcast regulations to insure communication of
political and controversial issues in the electronic media.

Douberley, The Free Speech-Free Press Dichotomy: Access to the Press
Through Advertising, 22 FLA. L. REV. 293 (1969).
This article avoids the rhetorical and emotional approach that many
"right to access" advocates have employed, and adopts a pragmatic
analysis of the free-speech-free-press dichotomy, providing the reader
statistical research data to support its thesis. The author assigns
responsibility for the development of this first amendment conflict to
essentially two significant forces-the judiciary and the newspaper
industry itself. On the one hand, the courts are criticized for their
traditionally separate and distinct considerations of free speech and free
press concepts. Historically, the cases have enforced and expanded
freedom of expression rights; yet jurists have continued to augment
protection for the press at a pace that has come to place the industry in
a position to suppress, legitimately, free expression in the nation's
newspapers. The author maintains that the dichotomy could have been
resolved in its initial stages, if not altogether avoided, had the judiciary
adopted a policy of simultaneous treatment of both concepts, since the
press itself is the focal point for dissemination of ideas. On the other
hand, concentration of ownership in the newspaper industry has
converted the competitive "profession" of responsive journalism into a
"business" of autonomous censorship, controlling both the availability
of the media as a forum for free communication and the content of the
information disseminated. Publishing policy is determined by these
powerful monopolists and influenced by other industries which
contribute philosophies, as well as finances, in seeking commercial
advertising space. The subtle pressure of subscribers who anticipate
majority views by virtue of prevailing public opinion on contemporary
issues is another significant factor. Although there is obvious
administrative and judicial concern over the economic combination
designs of the electronic media, as manifested by the regulatory
function of the FCC and its judicial supporting cast, the press has no
such governmental supervision, even though the same symptoms have
appeared therein.
Publishers consistently maintain that the "letter to the editor" aspect
of daily newspapers provides public access to the press, and satisfies
whatever affirmative first amendment obligation the industry might
bear. But the author argues that access is limited, inasmuch as the right
of editorial selection, a subject of free press guarantee, has traditionally
and justifiably been held to be inviolate. Relying on the fundamental
thesis of the positive interpretation of the first amendment (i.e.,
protection of the press must not be allowed to defeat its own purpose
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by denying right of access to the public), Douberley postulates his own
pragmatic system of access, maintaining that publishers are obligated to
provide for purchase of "advertorials": advertising space to communicate ideas and opinions. This method appears to be a reasonable
compromise, since the terms and rates of commercial advertising would
be applicable. In addition, advertising columns are not subject to
standard economic pressures and necessities; advertising volume
determines newspaper size, so that additional advertising not only
creates room for its message, but also establishes a proportional amount
of editorial space. Therefore, the editor's undisputed right to contradict
any advertorial in his own editorial columns would dispel the industry's
fear that advertisements appear to the public to have the endorsement
of the publisher.
On the other hand, every newspaper retains an unrestricted right to
censor or exclude any "advertorial" under the "right-to-refuse" theory.
Specific regulations may vary among publishers as to subject matter,
form, and size, but every member of the newspaper industry
admonishes the prospective advertiser that his purchase may be refused
without cause, except for political advertisements during election
campaigns. The theory is supported by authoritative precedent
establishing the publishing business as a private enterprise, and
therefore under no legal obligation to sell advertising without
discrimination.
However, the author foresees a decline of this theory and increased
judicial support for his position. He notes a significant common fact in
all cases that have sustained the right to refuse: the communications
submitted for publication were strictly commercial in nature, while
content has never been in issue. Douberley cites cases recognizing
protest groups' right to advertising space in quasi-public forums to
communicate political or social messages, in support of his conclusion
that the courts are on the threshold of a significant departure from the
right-to-refuse theory. He synthesizes his argument by contending that
the courts are constitutionally bound to deny the newspaper industry's
claim that the right-to-refuse concept may be utilized against
advertorials, since judicial precedent as to commercial advertising is
inapplicable to free expression advertisements.

Botein, Access to Cable Television, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 419 (1972).
This article depicts the Federal Communications Commission's past
and present methods of regulating the burgeoning Cable television
industry as "at best inappropriate and at worst futile".' Traditional
methods of regulating the single channel broadcasting industry such as
1. 57 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 421 (1972).
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comparative licensing hearings, or license renewal hearings would be
useless as a mode of regulation in this new industry because it would
place an impossible administrative burden on the already inadequate
FCC staff. Other traditional approaches, such as the application of the
fairness doctrine, would of necessity be discarded since the great
increase in the total number of channels available both for viewing and
for access would make the doctrine an anachronism. New methods of
regulation must be adopted which nurture rather than "freeze out" this
new industry, while at the same time promote its two most desirable
attributes: a maximum of both diversity and accessibility.
While recognizing that the FCC's present policy of antisiphoning
could produce the requisite diversity in spite of itself (rather than
because of itself) the author suggests a combination of three novel
approaches to produce the desired effect.
The first method would be to allow the industry to be regulated by
the "marketplace". This "laissez faire" approach, while possibly the
simplest and certainly the cheapest solution, has as its primary
drawback the exclusion of all but the well-heeled from easy access.
Moreover, as illustrated by the one channel broadcasting industry,
diversity would be stifled by the demands of commercial advertising.
To correct these problems the second approach, "administrative
regulation", could be superimposed on the marketplace to create a
restricted marketplace. Here, rate regulation must be ruled out as being
neither feasible nor efficient, and restrictions surface in the form of a
guarantee of fairness which is implemented by requiring old cable
operators to publish rates and provide three separate channels to the
public on a first come, non-discriminating basis. Although this solution
is an improvement over the "laissez-faire" market-place approach, the
author points up its latent bugs.
The third method is designated "formula for access". This approach
requires a regulatory body to adopt strict but ambulatory standards to:
(1) spell out both priorities between groups competing for use of the
various channels, as well as percentages of total time available to the
various groups; (2) ascertain the most popular channels in terms of
viewing audience, and then effect a balance between this and total time
allotted to each group, and; (3) set up financial guidelines for users,
both commercial and non-commercial, to promote more effective
access.

